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(3) there Is the obvious absence o! a code 
or clear rUles o! International law or defini-
tion of legal disputes realistically protecting 
us from judicial Interference with our for-
eign policy, upon which we depend for na-
tional security. 
On the other hand, If the world peace 
through law program Is reoriented to give 
priority to the solution of these problems, 
It may, as nations gradually gain confidence, 
be helpful In the limited area where dis-
putes are really subject to judicial solution. 
However, any Implication that this alone 
will bring peace Is a harmfUl delusion. Man-
i!estly, all history proves that most wars 
are due to political disputes, which can 
only be solved by agreements reached a!ter 
the glve-and-ta.ke of d1plomatlc negotla-
tlon&-ln which judges woUld have no rules 
and for which they have no quallftcatlons. 
Let us hitch our wagon to the stars, but 
not deceive ourselves by substituting slogans 
for solutions--nor, as lawyers, omit relevant 
facts and ignore alternative solutions In the 
current debate on Connally. 
OF LATIN 
Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, I invite 
the attention of my colleagues to a very 
scholarly, enlightening, and forthright 
article which appeared in the New York 
Times magazine of December 4, 1960. 
It was written by our distinguished ma-
jority leader, the senior Senator from 
Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD], and is en-
titled "The Basic Problem of Latin 
America." 
In it the distinguished Senator sug-
gests that we must start planning and 
coordinating our oversea policies in re-
gard to Latin America. He refers to 
the "beachhead societies" along the 
coasts of Latin America, and the wide 
gap between those beachheads and the 
poverty-stricken masses in the intetior. 
It is his wise belief-and well should it 
be observed by Members of the Con-
gress--that our country, along with 
Latin American countries, should inte-
grate and coordinate their policies, if we 
are to make our future position in Latin 
America meaningful and truly helpful. 
I ask unanimous consent that the 
article be printed in the REcoRD. 
There being no objection, the article 
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, 
as follows: 
THE BASIC PROBLEM OF LATIN AMERICA 
(By Mn<E MANSFIELD) 
When the new admlnlstratlon takes office 
In January it wlil find the old problems or 
Latin America stlll on the doorstep of the 
White House. It wll! not be able to step over 
or around these problems. It ls going to 
have to face them frankly, decide promptly 
What can be done about them and begin in 
earnest to act on them. 
As a nation, we have reawakened to our 
stake ln the Western Hemisphere and certain 
recent actions of Congress refiect this re-
awakening. We have, for example, expanded 
the lending facllltles of our Export-Import 
Bank and joined ln the creation of the Inter-
American Development Bank. Most recently, 
Congress proposed a broad new approach to 
the Inter-American problems ln authorizing 
$500 ml!llon to begin a new ald program. 
And Under Secretary Dlllon followed 
through at the inter-American economic 
meeting at Bogota, Colombia, with a pledge 
of U.S. cooperation In dealing with Latin 
America's economic and social problems. 
In short, the legal means for a new ap-
proach to Latin America have been accum-
ulated. Their etrectlve use awaits the 
touch of alert and sensitive leadership from 
the new admlnlstratlon. 
The Importance of that kind of leader-
ship ln Inter-American atralrs cannot be 
overemphasized. Unless It Is present, there 
Is a danger that we shall Interpret the 
Latin American situation prlmarlly In terms 
of Castrolsm and communism. If we do so, 
the basic problem will elude us. To be 
sure, Castroism and communism are power-
ful forces, but they are In the nature of an 
elfect rather than a cause. Underlying their 
presence on the stage ln Cuba and In the 
wings elsewhere In Latin America Is a more 
fundamental factor. 
In plainest terms, the basic problem of 
Latin America Is that the social structures 
of ltlany nations of the region are seriously 
out of date and cannot endure ln their pres-
ent form ln the second hal! of the 2oth 
century. They cannot endure for the simple 
reason that they do not deliver enough edu-
cation, enough food, shelter and clothing, 
enough medical aid, enough of the conven-
iences that are taken for granted ln this 
country and are relatively commonplace ln 
Western Europe and even ln Soviet Russia. 
Most Important, they do not provide for a 
sufficient number of people that lntangllble 
but essential element of prideful participa-
tion In the present and hope for the future 
which ls the keynote of political stab1llty. 
The lnablllty of many Latin American na-
tions to meet the needs of their people arises 
not so much from underdevelopment as 
from extremely lopsided development. In 
Peru, for example, during a plane fl1ght of 
2 hours one can travel to places that dllfer 
In development by several centuries. 
That Is the extent o! the lag between 
the capital of Lima with Its wide boUle-
vards, plazas, skyscrapers, modern conven-
Iences and traffic problems and the quiet, 
wretchedly poor vlllages In the Andean 
highlands to the east, Inhabited by llllterate 
Indians who scratch out a bare existence 
using primitive agricultural methods. Fly-
Ing 2 hours further to the east, the plane 
sets down In an isolated clearing In the 
Amazonian jungle stalked by trlbespeople 
who stlll hunt with polson-tipped darts. 
Here the soclsl lag Is measured ln mlllennla. 
In Lima Itself, a !Iterate and cultured 
minority llve surrounded by a vast urban 
poor whose lot Is one o! unspeakable squalor. 
The poor know what decent housing ls but 
they do not have lt. They know that mod-
ern medical care can cure but they are not 
cured. They know that education Is bene-
ficial but they are not educated. In short, 
the decencies of modern life are clearly vis-
Ible to them and, just as clearly, beyond 
their reach. 
Peru ls not unique. Lopsided develop-
ment Is to be found In greater or lesser de-
gree In just about every nation In Latin 
America. It Is a consequence of the unique 
complex of cUltural and economic forces that 
has shaped these societies over the centuries. 
The modern Latin American nations began 
as beachheads In the New World In much the 
same way as dld our original 13 States. Un-
llke this Nation, however, the social struc-
ture of most of our southern neighbors more 
or less atrophied In this form. 
The European-derived mlnorltles In the 
cities provided the economic organization 
necessary for a limited tapping of the great 
natural wealth of the interiors, which was 
funneled abroad largely In the form of ex-
ports of food and raw materials. The returns 
from these exports were hoarded or spent 
abroad or were stopped largely at the beach-
head cities. This process underlles the great 
concentration of wealth ln a few hands and 
the spectacular growth of some Latin Amer-
Ican cities Into Islands of lush modernism 
and great cUlture In a sea of social stagna-
tion. 
For the many Latin Americans In the city 
slums and particUlarly In the hinterlands, 
the process has had llttle constructive rele-
vance. Through generations they have con-
tinued to llve out their llves In ancient In-
dian and tribal patterns. Or lf they have 
been drawn Into the process, it has been to 
provide the labor to grow, to extract and to 
move commodities to the beachheads. They 
have received few benefits In the form of 
sufficient food, better health, greater com-
forts and opportunities for self-development. 41 
Not only ln an economic sense have most 
of the people of Latin America been by-
standers, or mere cogs, in the beachhead so-
cieties. They were also bypassed for a long 
time by the concepts of responsible govern-
ment and freedom when these ideas Invaded 
Latin America In the 19th century. 
These new clarions did not reach much 
beyond the beachheads and they were heard 
almost exclusively by the small minorities. 
The balance of the popUlace was summoned 
by them, If at all, only at moments of qUix-
otic ftareup which changed rulers without 
brlngtng about changes In the basic struc-
ture or Latin American society. 
The pressure for deep change In this struc-
ture, however, has been accumUlating stead-
Uy for several decades, notably since World 
War II. It Is fed from intricate sources but 
certainly it Is due for the major part to the 
stagnation of agricUlture under antiquated 
systems of production and exploitative sys-
tems of land tenure at a time of rapidly 
expancUng popUlation. 
It Is fed, too, by the beginnings of an ln-
dustrlallzatlon that has Intensified urban 
concentration and brought more and more 
poople Into a direct awareness of the inade-
quacy of their lot In contrast to the glaring 
wealth and opportunities of a few. 
Perhaps most of all, the accumulating 
pressure for deep-seated change Is a conse-
quence of modern communications. Ideas 
no longer stop at the beachheads. The slum 
dwellers of the Latin-American cltles and the 
poverty-stricken vlllagers of the hinterlands 
alike have heard the message from this 
country, from Europe, and from Soviet 
Russia. 
Mlil!ons of Latin Americans are now per-
suaded that a stole sutrerlng of misery or 
repression Is not a virtue. The more that 
this concept is disseminated and takes root, 
the more the pressure for change lntenslftes 
and along with It the search for leaders 
capable of bringing about such change. 
Responsible Latin-American statesmen 
know that the long-range problem confront-
Ing their countries Is to convert the beach-
head societies Into stable national structures. 
But the lmmedltae problem Is to cut the 
social lags which exist between the cities and 
the hinterlands, between the a11luent minor-
Ities and the poor in the cities themselves. 
For, because of these lags, the pitch of the 
demagog more often than not Is able ·to 
rise above the voice of reason, and the tan-
gible promises of repress! ve Ideologies tend to 
swamp the abstractions of freedom. 
An adequate solution to the Immediate 
problem of social lag Is essential if durable 
progress Is to be made on the long-range 
problem of developing responsible, stable 
governments ln Latin America. 
The key to the solution is an Indigenous 
leadership which has the courage to risk 
shifting substantially the base of political 
support from the entrenched and powertul 
few to the many. Even If the shift is made, 
the leadership must stU! have the wisdom 
and restrain to use this broadened polltlcal 
power not for a new entrenchment of per-
sonal power but for the bUilding of Institu-
tions of freedom and progress. 
That kind of leadership has not been 
conspicuous In Latin America untl! com-
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more than one judge." Can anyone really 
doubt how any judges nominated by dicta-
tors like Castro, Nasser, Trujillo, Sukarno, 
Nkrumah and Toure and many others, 
whether Communist or not, will vote on Is-
sues which their bosses deem vital to their 
own nations? 
The election of judges Is by concurrent 
action of the General Assembly and the Se-
curity Council. The 11-member Security 
Council already has one permanent Commu-
nist member, and when the neutralists led 
by Nehru (and also many western nations) 
have their way with the admission of Red 
China, there will be two permanent Com-
munist members. But In addition to that, 
the majority of the Security Council (six) 
are elected by the General Assembly bi-
annually-which thus has the ultimate con-
trol of the composition of the Security 
Council. The United States has but one vote 
out of 99 (the present membership of the 
General Assembly). By contrast, the African 
bloc alone has a vote of 26.17 Yet It Is not 
merely those who openly cooperate with the 
Soviets, like Nkrumah, but Nehru, who Is 
currently reported as saying the United Na-
tions Charter Is "weighted too much In favor 
of Europe and the Americas at the expense 
of Asia and Africa." 18 
We are not concerned with diplomatic rea-
sons for the tremendous changes now going 
on, or with the future of the United Nations, 
but solely with the obvious fact that the 
electoral machinery for World Court judges 
plainly Invites political maneuvering. It 
should be manifest to all that as the present 
six vacancies are filled and as a third of the 
Court Is triennially renewed, the World 
Court will Include not only two Communist 
judges as at present, but more and more 
judges, whether coming from Communist or 
other monolithic states, who will regard 
themselves as agents of their respective 
states with no tradition of an Independent 
judiciary. If we are Interested In nonpo-
litical and unbiased judges, Is not such 
political jockeying and maneuvering In the 
changing General Assembly (and Indirectly 
In the Security Council) and the future per-
'' Senate Hearings 45, 61. 
"Changes In the Security Council will In-
evitably follow. It Is widely conceded that 
the close vote this year Indicates Red China 
will be admitted next year. When the re-
maining 19 African colonies are freed and 
admitted to the U.N., the African bloc, 85 
percent Illiterate and largely uncivilized, 
with but a slightly larger population, will 
have 45 times the voting power of the United 
States. The United States' voting power will 
be further diluted on the admission of 18 
more Asiatic nations. 
18 The Nehru statement was reported In the 
Baltimore Sun, October 4, 1960; the popula-
tion figures are reported In various pu bllca-
tlons--see, for example, U.S. News, October 
3, 1960; and the shifting power has been 
widely commented upon--see, for example, 
U.S. News, August 22, 1960; New York Times, 
September 18, 25 and October 2, 1960. The 
reductio ad absurdum Is that 31 of the pres-
ent member states are not as large as a single 
average state of the United States, like 
Maryland, and yet have 31 times the voting 
of the entire United States. Indeed, there 
are a number of them not as large as a single 
Maryland county. Moreover, what has hap-
pened to the basic reform project of weighted 
representation, advocated long before the 
United States' voting strength based on 
numbers alone had dropped to Its 1 percent 
present level of absurdity-e.g., Rhyne, supra, 
note 14. Khrushchev Is reported widely to 
be trying to rule or ruin the U.N. Itself. 
But, Irrespective of ultimate or present suc-
cess In such efforts, nobody can believe that 
Communist judges on a World Court will 
block their master's wishes on issues their 
bosses deem vital. 
sonnet of the World Court Infinitely more 
Important than the past voting recorda of 
prior judges (so stressed by proponents), 
which largely reflect (a) their selection by a 
smaller number of more advanced nations 
before the cold war became so hot, and (b) 
decisions in cases which have not involved 
matters of the magnitude which could lead 
to peace or war, or which Involved national 
security? 
The present argument Is not whether 
biased judges will constitute a majority of 
the Court. No lawyer wants even a few 
biased judges. Decisions often turn on a 
few votes. For example, there were 5 dis-
sents and 1 partial dissent out of 14 judges 
sitting In the World Court In the Corfu case 
(Senate hearings, 360). There were divided 
opinions In 75 percent of the cases heard 
In the last term of our own Supreme Court, 
Including a 5-to-4 division In a matte!' In-
volving Federal supremacy over the States. 
It can hardly be doubted how the admit-
tedly Communist judges would act in cases 
that might Involve, for example, CUba and 
Panama. But would not judges from the 
Arable countries, In view of the recent can-
cellation of the canal lease, be likewise 
biased? So that matter, how would judges 
from the South American bloc react? Or on 
questions of confiscation and expropriation 
of property In Cuba or elsewhere, how would 
judges from countries which have recently 
Indulged In the same practice free them-
selves of their national Interest? Our Guan-
tanamo Naval Base, under perpetual lease 
from Cuba (obtained after we had freed 
Cuba from Spain), Is concededly the key-
stone of our Caribbean defense. Castro cur-
rently threatens to have our rights deter-
mined by "international law." Are we really 
willing to delegate its disposal, which may 
Involve our national survival, to such a 
court? 19 
If the Issues Involved are minor legal dis-
putes not really Involving fundamental Is-
sues, then we must realize and accept the 
view that a program of world peace through 
law must be much more gradual than Its 
proponents suggest. If, on the other hand, 
the World Court Is really to decide Issues 
involving International disputes of a magni-
tude which may lead to war, then we must 
be prepared to transfer from our elected 
representatives to a World Court decisions 
Involving fundamental national foreign 
pol!cy and our national security. If the 
latter, few judges on a World Court will find 
It humanly possible to divorce themselves 
from their overriding Interest In and their 
loyalty to, their own country and Its allies. 
Are there then any rules llrnlting the juris-
diction of the World Court and defining the 
law It would administer? 
VAGUENESS OF JUSTICIABLE DISPUTES AND INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 
Bar a&Soclatlons spend much effort In 
making domestic law more certain and .pre-
dictable through codification, uniform 
statutes, restatement of the law, etc. Courts 
demand precision of statute as a protection 
to defendants In the criminal courts. Where 
Is the precision In the international law 
which nobody has attempted to codify? Yet, 
certainty Is of transcendant Importance to 
whole nations if the program of "world peace 
through law" !s to resolve Issues which may 
really Involve peace or war. Do we find any 
real guide for judges from 15 nations !n the 
loose language of article 38 of the statute? 
1. International custom as evidence of a 
general practice accepted as law? Surely 
customs have varied widely between nations 
and have been both accepted and rejected 
at various times, so that there !s l!ttle area 
where agreement !s general. Or In 
2. Principles of law recognized by civilized 
nations-Moslem? Asian? South American? 
"See Hanson Baldwin, Saturday Evening 
Post, Sept. 24, 1960. 
African? Is Cuba c! vll!zed after 60 years of 
Independence, or Congo after 90 days? But 
can the World Court say members of the 
United Nations are not even civilized? :o 
Or !n 
3. Publicists' teachings. There will be 
much difference of opinion on who are au-
thoritative publicists and, as pointed out 
above, !t Is conceded that the area of Inter-
national law Is Increasing. 
Nor could decisions of the World Court 
have much effect as precedents (statute, art. 
59). Surely, It Is Infinitely more Important 
In this realm of conflicting Ideologies, legal 
systems, opposing rules of pu bllclsts, than 
in the field of relatively uniform domestic 
law to codify, or at least define, the rules In 
advance. Lack of certainty was but recently 
stated to be the basic cause of the wide-
spread distrust and disuse of the World 
Court."" 
Then again, there Is no clear rule on what 
Is justiciable and what Is political. This 
goes to the heart of the matter and Is not 
solved by restriction to legal disputes. The 
claim " that matters so poll tlcally lmportan t 
as the Berlin and Suez crises could be mate-
rially affected by judicial decisions seems 
Incredible. Does anyone actually believe 
that significant parts of these Issues will be 
left to a court to decide In the light of cur-
rent history? Or the Cuban crisis, where 
(absent a political solution by the Organiza-
tion of American States) the President has 
Indicated the (unilateral) Monroe Doctrine 
will be Invoked If necessary to hemisphere 
defense and our national safety? 
It Is now argued by proponents that a 
World Court would be helpful to the collec-
tion of financial claims. Aside from the 
legal problem posed by the limitation of 
access to the World Court to only nations 
as parties, under Article 34(1) of the statute, 
there Is no substantial record of Its success-
ful use for this purpose In the past, and cer-
tainty of law In this limited area Is just as 
essential for a World Court as for a domes-
tic court. 
CONCLUSION 
The cold war since 1946 has demonstrated 
the Imperative need for caution In unilateral 
judicial disarmament. It Is submitted 
therefore that this Is not the time to repeal 
the Connally amendment because (1) It 
would weaken our position vis-a-vis, not 
only Communist nations but substantially 
all great powers, unless we substitute some 
of their non-Connally type safety conditions 
or reservations; " (2) the World Court will 
Inevitably Include more and more Commu-
n!st and political judges as the relative 
voting power of the more advanced Western 
nations continues to decline through the ad-
mission of numerous little primitive states; 
•• Yet neither Communist nations nor many 
of the new members are "civilized" under or-
thodox definitions--e.g., 1 Oppenheim, "In-
ternational Law" 1905, p. 31; Hall, "Interna-
tional Law" 1909, p. 39. 
"E.g., Rhyne, supra, note 14. 
,, See World Peace Through Law Commit -
tee Report, page 24. 
"' Such as (a) the right to withdraw at 
will, like most of the great powers, or (b) a 
clearer national security reservation, which 
was the obvious Intent of the Connally Res-
ervation and which is Inherent In a concep-
tion of national sovereignty. It should be 
noted that such reservations are much 
broader than the Connally-type reservation, 
since they plainly would cover political dis-
putes as well as legal disputes. (c) Profes-
sor Sohn (46 A.B.A.J. 25) called sixteen res-
ervations major without counting the right 
to withdraw at will, and suggested alterna-
tives to outright repeal. These also should 
be studied Instead of being blandly Ignored 
as they are by the leaders In the repeal 
movement. 
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pa.rat!vely recent times. But It is begin-
ning, now, to appear with Increasing fre-
quency. Wherever It has appeared, as In 
Venezuela and Peru, to cite just two exam-
ples, Its hold Is st!ll most tenuous. The old 
centers of power contract slowly and the 
social lags still breed demagogs. 
Yet, In spite or these obstacles, the tran-
sition from beachhead to modern states 
must go forward. If It is not led by those 
who believe In freedom, it will surely be 
pushed by those who do not. Specifically, 
any Latin American nation which tackles 
this problem must move on several fronts 
simultaneously: 
1. It must act, at once, to alleviate the 
most glaring Inadequacies in diet, housing, 
and health from which tens of millions of 
people suJfer. 
2. It must Improve agriculture by diversi-
fying crops. broadening land ownership, ex-
panding cultivable acreage, and introducing 
modern agricultural techniques on a wide 
scale In order to increase production, par-
ticularly of food. 
3. It must bring about the establishment 
or a steadily expanding range of industries. 
4. It must wipe out Illiteracy within a few 
years and provide adequate facUlties to edu-
cate an ever-increasing number of highly 
trained technicians, specialists, and profes-
sionals to provide the whole range of modern 
services. 
5. It must end the relative !solation of the 
beachheads from the Interiors and the parts 
of the 1n terlor from one another by a vast 
enlargement or existing systems of trans-
portation and communications. 
Effective free government in Latin Amer-
ica can achieve much of what needs to be 
done by marshaling the unused or partially 
used labor potential and capital or its own 
people. It can act to transfer initiative, 
energies, and resources from Paris and 
Monte Carlo, so to speak, to Arequipa and 
Tucuman. 
But even if these sources have been tap-
ped, the total capacity for doing what must 
be done IS likely to fall short of the job. 
It is precisely at this point that recognition 
of our long-range national Interest, and ac-
ceptance of the responsibillties of leadership 
in this hemisphere, can be decisive. 
In the past our economic pollcies respect-
ing Latin America have not been focused on 
the problem of the beachhead nature of its 
societies. We have dabbed at the Inner dif-
ficulties of the Latin American nations with 
small point 4 programs and In other ran-
dom ways. These have helped-but 1n a 
most llmited fashion. 
The emphasis of our pollcles has been on 
encouraging the ftow of private U.S. 
investment. This approach has had the 
effect of reinforcing the beachheads 
rather than modifying them. For the most 
part, the products and returns ·of this enter-
prise ftow abroad or are held in the beach-
head cities. Only a relative handful of 
Latin-Americans have benefited. 
I! we aim our policies at the problem of 
the transition from the beachheads, It should 
be readily apparent that our agricultural 
surpluses will have great relevance to the 
Immediate problem of massive malnutrition 
In Latin America. There Is great relevance, 
too, In the capacities of the Export-Import 
Bank and the Inter-American Development 
Bank and other sources to the expansion or 
transportation and communications facil-
Ities. Finally, the new aid program au-
thorized by Congress can be poln ted directly 
at the enormous needs In housing, health 
and education. 
Aid from the United States w!ll not help 
to end the beachheads If It continues to be 
applied haphazardly. It wU! be effective 
only If It moves in coordinated channels 
toward specific, measurable goals of social 
and economic development In Latin 
America. 
To bring about such a ftow we must first 
centralize control over the various aid 
sources within our own Government. Sec-
ond, we must Insist that the Latin-American 
leaders plan and act with us to use aid In 
combination with the energies and resources 
of their respective countries to bulld sinews, 
rather than symbols, of modern progress. 
Unless we accept for ourselves, and are 
able through leadership and diplomacy to 
get recipient countries to accept, the idea 
of an Integrated approach for all fUture aid 
activities, development in the Americas is 
not likely to be brought about under the 
aegis of freedom. A new and larger sprin-
kling of aid In the old random pattern will 
produce little growth. Better prices and a 
larger market for coffee, sugar or whatever 
may act as tranqu!llzers but they wlll not 
cure the 111. 
As a nation, we have got to face up to that 
fact. So, too, must the Latin-Americans. 
That Is the challenge to the new administra-
tion. It Is a challenge to rid our Latin-
American policies of sterile slogans and 
shibboleths which have heretofore obscured 
the problems. It Is a challenge to supply the 
national and hemispheric leadership and the 
administrative followthrough that will use 
existing resources In a concentrated program 
to enlarge the beachhead societies of Latin 
America Into truly national, democratic 
states. 
The success of that effort Is essential to 
Latin America's future. It is essential to 
the future of this Nation. 
RELEASE OF TWO AMERICAN FLIERS 
BY RUSSIA 
Mr. FONG. Mr. President, last week 
the Soviet Union made a grandstand 
play by releasing two American fliers 
Russia had held illegally since last July, 
when, in a plain act of piracy on the 
high seas, the Communists shot down a 
U.S. RB-47 reconnaissance bomber over 
international waters. 
Certainly we all rejoice for the men 
and their families who had been so 
cruelly and so unnecessarily separated 
by the Communist pirates. 
At the same time, we should not de-
lude ourselves that the cold war is now 
thawing. This was no act of humani-
tarianism on the part of the Communists. 
It was a transparent propaganda move 
to score a palpable hit with the rest of 
the world. Undoubtedly, Mr. Khru-
shchev hopes we will interpret his action 
as an indication of Soviet willingness to 
make concessions in the interest of re-
lieving tensions between the two great 
powers. 
As the Washington Post and Times 
Herald pointed out in an excellent edi-
torial last Friday: 
It Is no more a concession than the agree-
ment of a recalcitrant child, In expectation 
of reward, to stop throwing stones or break-
Ing up the furniture. 
What reward-or ransom-President 
Kennedy paid to Mr. Khrushchev for the 
release of our two fliers held hostage 
by the Russians has not yet been re-
vealed to the American people. I sin-
cerely hope our new administration has 
not begun a policy of appeasement as 
part of its self-styled "quiet diplomacy." 
For, if the administration paid a big 
price to obtain release of 2 Americans, 
Mr. Khrushchev will demand an even 
bigger price to reveal the fate of 11 other 
Americans whose unarmed transport was 
shot down by Soviet fighter planes in 
September 1958. According to a Soviet 
magazine recently published, the 11 
United States airmen parachuted to 
safety and were promptly imprisoned 
by the Soviets. The same magazine has 
just retracted this statement, but doubt 
persists. 
If Mr. Khrushchev truly desires to 
ease cold war tensions, let him come 
clean about this incident. If he does 
not, then we can only assume that he 
intends to use his captives as political 
pawns in the cold war, j\lst as he has 
done in the past. 
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to have printed in the REcoRD at 
this point three analytical statements 
on these questions: the Post editorial, 
an article by David Lawrence In the 
Washington Evening Star of January 27, 
and an article by Roscoe Drummond in 
the Post of January 28. 
There being no objection, the editorial 
and articles were ordered to be printed 
in the RECORD as follows: 
[From the Washington Post, Jan. 27, 1961] 
CHEERS FOR WHAT? 
All Americans w111 rejoice that the two 
surviving RB-47 filers have been released 
from their priSon in the Soviet Union. Un-
questionably this move does, as President 
Kennedy remarked, remove a serious obstacle 
to peaceful relations between the United 
States and the Soviet Union. But before 
there are too many handsprings, It is useful 
to analyze what the Soviet Union has really 
done. 
The RB-47 Incident was not at all In the 
category of the U-2 flights over the Soviet 
Union, which Mr. Kennedy has wisely or-
dered not be resumed. In those overflights 
the United States was legally the offender. 
The RB-47 was shot down by Soviet planes 
over International waters, and the a.!Ialr was 
misrepresented by the Soviet Union 1n an 
obvious attempt to embarrass the United 
States at the time. 
What, then, does the release signify? It 
merely permits the Soviet Union to purge 
itself in some degree of an action which was 
lllegal In the first place and which cost the 
llves of four other Americans. This. could 
have been done at any time during the last 
6 months in response to the entreaties of 
President Eisenhower. The Soviet Govern-
ment delayed the step In a transparent effort 
to Ingratiate Itself with the Kennedy ad-
ministration with the appearance of a con-
cession. 
The release Is to be welcomed on Its own 
account, and there wlll be hopes that It w111 
pave the way for some ~ort of mutual Inter-
est negotiation. But the mere cessation of 
outrageous behavior makes Mr. Khrushchev 
not one whit le•s an implacable adversary. 
It Is no more a concession than the agree-
ment of a recalltrant child, in expectation 
of reward, to stop throwing stones or break-
Ing up the furniture. 
WHAT ABOUT THE 0THERS?-FATE OF il FLIERS 
UNEXPLAINED 
(By Roscoe Drummond) 
There is every reason to welcome the ac-
tion of the Soviet Union in freeing the two 
U.S. filers whose plane, the RB-47, the Rus-
sians shot down over the International wa-
ters of the Barents Sea last July. 
But It would be an egregious mistake to 
construe tb.ls gesture as In Itself easing any 
of the significant tensions of the cold war 
or as offering evidence that the Soviets 
want to negotiate productively with Presi-
dent Kennedy. 
Mr. Kennedy is making it clear that he 
does not Intend to be drawn Into premature, 
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unprepared summit talks. To him, this 
means proof that there Is some basis tor a. 
meeting or minds. 
To free two American fliers who should 
never have been detained and whose plane 
should never have been shot down (since It 
was not over Soviet terri tory) Is no evidence 
whatsoever that Mr. Khrushchev wants to 
settle anything with Mr. Kennedy except on 
Soviet terms. 
It may be evidence that Mr. Khrushchev 
wants to build a. little good will before ap-
proaching the new administration on a.ny 
score. As such It should be accepted for 
exactly what It Is-a. rectification of some-
thing which was wrong In the first place. 
What about the 11 Americans who had 
not been heard !rom since their unarmed 
U.S. transport plane, which lost Its bearing 
a. few miles over the Soviet-Turkish frontier 
In September, 1958, was shot down by So-
viet fighter planes? 
At that time the Soviets turned over the 
bodies of six dead U.S. airmen and blandly 
assured us that they had not seen, had no 
knowledge of, and had done nothing to the 
other members of the crew. 
The news, which has now come out vla 
East Germany and was teprlnted perhars 
accidentally by a Soviet m~azlne, Is that 
the Soviets captured the 11 filers after they 
ha.d parachuted to safety and Immediately 
imprisoned them. There Is still no word 
from them or about them: Mr. Khrushchev 
says he doesn't believe the Soviet mag!izlr.e. 
You will recall that shortly after this In-
cident Soviet Deputy Premier Anastas Mlko-
yan was visiting Washington In the Interests 
of trade and good will. I recounted some-
thing of the behavior In this report a.t the 
time: 
Mr. Mlkoyan put on a. heavy act of Injured 
innocence when the President, the VIce 
President, Secretary Dulles, ·and members of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Co=lttee kept 
asking him about what happened to the 17-
man crew o! the American plane. 
Mr. Mlkoyan pulled out all the stops. He 
was pained; he was hurt; he was mystified; 
he was excruciatingly baflled by the picky 
questions which the Americans oddly In-
sisted upon putting to him. He held up his 
hands In a grand gesture of puzzlement to 
Mr. Nixon and exclaimed: "Why should we 
hide anything? Why are Americans so sus-
picious about this?" 
Finally, In hls Interview with Secretary 
Dulles he made as though he could stand It 
no longer and professed to be downright 
Irritated because the officials o! the United 
States did not seem to accept his personal 
and official assurances that the American 
transport had not been shot down, that It 
ha.d crashed o! Its own fault and that 
(beyond the 6 bodies of the 17-man crew) 
the Soviets had told all-absolutely. 
We still do not have the answer to Mr. 
Mlkoyan's rhetorical question: "Why should 
we hide anything?" but we do have the an-
swer to his other question: "Why are Ameri-
cans so suspicious?" 
We are suspicious because the whole Soviet 
explanation was fishy on Its face and the 
denials have now been found to be untrue. 
The Soviet magazine, In reprinting an article 
from an East German Communist publica-
tion, discloses that the 11 unreported U.S. 
filers were detained by the Soviets and have 
been held lnco=unlcado ever since. This, 
despite repeated Soviet statements that they 
had not round them. 
It should not be overlooked that the 
Soviets took the case of the two U 13. RB-47 
filers, now released, to the U.N. Security 
Council, demanding that the U.N. condemn 
the United States for violating International 
law. When the Security Council suggested 
the facts be Investigated, Russia vetoed this 
proposal. Preposterous Idea, Investigating 
the !acts. Now that the two RB-47 filers 
have been freed, what about the other 11? 
Or does Moscow want to hold them back to 
build more good will? 
[From the Washington Star, Jan. 27, 1961) 
U.S. PRICE FOR RELEASED FLIEBS-PRESIDENT'S 
STATEMENT ON SoVIET ACTION VIEWED AS 
LEAVING SOME QUESTIONS 
(By David Lawrence) 
What ransom price did the U.S. Govern-
ment pay the Soviet Government to elfect 
the release of the two flyers from the RB-47 
who were kidnapped on the high seas and 
held for 7 months without being permitted 
to co=unlcate with their own Govern-
ment? Did this country make any conces-
sions to the Soviets, and, I! so, just what 
were they? Some Senators are asking these 
questions. 
As one studies the transcript o! President 
Kennedy's first news conference, It Is appar-
ent that the administration here has not 
given to the American people the whole 
story of just what happened In the ex-
changes o! messages between Moscow and 
Washington In the last few days. 
One of the newsmen asked this question: 
"Mr. President, can you tell us something 
about what your role was, I! you had one, 
In the release of these fliers? Did this come 
about as a consequence o! some action you 
took?" 
Mr. Kennedy did not answer the question. 
He simply said that "this matter has been 
under discussion" by the American Ambas-
sador In Moscow and Soviet authorities. 
The reporters were not satisfied with this 
avoidance of the Issue and asked the Presi-
dent this question: 
"In consequence of Mr. Khrushchev's ap-
parent Indication last week o! a willingness 
to release the American flyers, have you sent 
any co=unlca.tlon to him through Ambas-
sador Thompson or otherwise?" 
Mr. Kennedy's answer was: "We have had 
several exchanges with the Soviet authorities. 
I do not believe that one has taken place 
since the release o! the prisoners." 
Later In the news conference, there was 
a. further colloquy on this subject: 
Question: "Did the Russians ask any quid 
pro quo or did we make any concessions to 
them In exchange !or the release o! these 
filers? I! not, how do you account tor this 
remarkable turnabout In their relations with 
us?" 
Answer: "The statement which I have 
made Is a. statement which the U.S. Govern-
ment put forward on this matter, which I 
read to you earlier In regard to overflights. 
I would not attempt to make a. judgment all 
to why the Soviet Union chose to release 
them at this time. I did sa.y In my state-
ment to Mr. Arrowsmith (earlier In the press 
conference) that this had removed a. serious 
obstacle In the way of peaceful relations be-
tween the Soviet Union and the United 
States, and I would judge that they desire 
to remove that serious obstacle." 
Question: "Does that mean, sir, that they 
accepted a reassurance of no more over-
flights as an exchange?" 
Answer: "It 1s a. fact that I have ordered 
that the flights not be resumed, which Is a 
continuation of the order given by Presi-
dent Eisenhower In May of last year." 
This leaves unanswered exactly how and 
why and when the pledge was gl ven to the 
Soviet Union that no more U-2 overflights 
would be authorized. 
For one thing, Mr. Kennedy made It clear 
a.t the news conference that the shooting 
down of the RB-47 was In an entirely dif-
ferent category !rom the U-2 Incident. Ac-
tually, the RB-47's flyers were forced down 
over the open seas, where they had a right to 
be. I! there was no connetclon between the 
U-2 flights and the RB-47 Incident, the ques-
tion naturally arises as to why Mr. Kennedy 
felt It necessary to announce that during the 
discussions with the Soviet Union on the 
release o! the RB-4 7 flyers assurances had 
been given that the U-2 flights would not be 
resumed. 
The Inference Is clear that, whether the 
commitment not to resume U-2 flights was 
given In a. conversation at Moscow by Am-
bassador Thompson during the last few days 
separate from the one about the RB-47 flyers, 
the Soviets themselves took the two to be 
related a.nd based their action on It. 
In other words, the Soviets wanted to ap-
pear before the world as having achieved a 
diplomatic victory, and so they Insisted upon 
some assurance concerning the overflights. 
When this was given, the Soviets o! their 
own Initiative decided to release the flyers. 
It may well be argued whether the United 
States was party to a. "deal" but the plain 
facts are that, simultaneously with the re-
lease of the RB-47 flyers, a co=ltment was 
announced by President Kennedy that there 
would be no more U-2 overflights. 
This Is In some respects a disappointing 
turn of events. The United States has a. 
right to fly far above the ground and tho 
Soviet Union Insists upon the same right 
when It sends satellites around the globe 
that take photographs from high altitudes-
a. form of observation for military purposes. 
There Is no pledge as yet, moreover, that 
the Soviet Union will stop Its espionage here 
In the United States or Infiltration 1n other 
parts of the world, particularly Cuba., where 
It Is openly assisting a. government that Is 
hostile to the United States. 
Mr. Kennedy struggled through the press 
conference without making a definite state-
ment as to how much the United States con-
ceded to get the release o! flyers whom the 
Soviets, o! course, had no rlgh t to force down 
In the first place. 
DEDICATION OF NORTH MIAMI 
BEACH OSTEOPATHIC GENERAL 
HOSPITAL, MIAMI, FLA. 
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I ask 
unanimous consent to insert In the REc-
ORD a speech which I gave in Miami, Fla., 
November 20, 1960. The speech was de-
livered at a banquet held for fund-raising 
purposes for the proposed Osteopathic 
General Hospital of North Miami Beach, 
Fla. 
There being no objection, the speech 
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, 
as follows: 
SPEECH OF THE HONORABLE WAYNE MORSE, 
U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF OREGON, 
NOVEMBER 20, 1960, MIAMI, FLA. 
Ladles a.nd gentlemen, we have gathered 
together tonight not only to dedicate the 
financial drive !or a. wonderful North Miami 
Beach Osteopathic Genera.! Hospital to Its 
noble purposes, but also to rededicate our-
selves to the moral obligation o! promoting 
man's humanity to man. The privilege and 
trust Inherent In your Invitation to partici-
pate with you In this dedication ceremony 
moves me very deeply. 
As the offices o! the American Osteopathic 
Association well know, during my 16 years In 
the Senate I have always supported a.nd will 
continue to support equality of consideration 
for members o! the osteopathic school of 
medicine In any medical hospital or medical 
research program In which the Federal Gov-
ernment may play a. part. 
This proposed hospital In a very real sense 
will be both a. physical monument to, a.nd a.n 
Inspiring symbol of the self -sacrifices o! the 
many men and women both In a.nd out o! 
the osteopathic profession who will make 
this haven o! mercy and medical care a. 
reality. As the American Osteopathic Asso-
ciation has stated, "Your osteopathic hos-
pital Is more than bricks and stainless steel, 
more than costly equipment and specially 
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